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DISAVOWING THE WARRANT PRESUMPTION: HAVE THE
EXCEPTIONS FINALLY SWALLOWED THE RULE?
Floridav. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999)
Lawrence A. Dany*
Petitioner, the State of Florida, seized Respondent's automobile without
a warrant' under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act2 several months3
after police observed the car being used to deliver illegal narcotics.4 A

routine post-seizure inventory search of the car's interior produced two
pieces of crack cocaine which were subsequently used to charge
respondent with possession of a controlled substance.5 At trial, Respondent
filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the inventory
search 6 arguing that the warrantless seizure of his car violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.7 Initially, the trial court

* For my mother, my first and greatest teacher.
1. See Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 1557 (1999). Local authorities seized
Respondent's automobile from the parking lot of his place of employment. See White v. State, 710
So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 1998).
2. See Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-.707 (1999). The Act
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Any contraband article, vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other personal property, or
real property used in violation of any provision of the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken or is taking place, may be seized and shall be
forfeited....
FLA. STAT. § 932.703(l)(a).
3. "Personal property may be seized [under the Act] at the time of the violation or
subsequent to the violation" so long as the person entitled to notice is notified at the time of the
seizure. FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2)(a).
4. See White, 119 S. Ct. at 1557. Police observed Respondent using his car to deliver
cocaine on three separate occasions. See id. Respondent was arrested prior to the seizure on
unrelated charges. See id.
5. See id. at 1558.
6. See id.
7. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
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reserved ruling on the motion, and ultimately denied the motion when the
jury returned a guilty verdict.8 Affirming thejudgment of the trial court, the
First District Court of Appeals held that the warrantless seizure of
respondent's automobile did not violate the Fourth Amendment because
the seizure was based upon probable cause as required by the Forfeiture
Act.9 However, because neither the Florida Supreme Court nor the
Supreme Court of the United States had directly addressed the issue, the
First District certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether,
absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless seizure of an automobile
under the Forfeiture Act violated the Fourth Amendment. ° On review, a
divided Florida Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative,
concluding that, absent exigent circumstances, the Fourth Amendment
requires police to obtain a warrant prior to seizing property which has been
used in violation of the Forfeiture Act.II The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and in reversing the decision of the Florida Supreme
Court, HELD that the Fourth Amendment does not require police to obtain
a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place where there
was probable cause to believe that it was forfeitable contraband. 2
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.. ,,."
Historically, it has been arule of constitutional law that
searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a few specific and well-

Id.
Although the case raised issues of Florida constitutional law, see White v. State, 710 So. 2d 949,
950 (Fla. 1998), article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution expressly holds that it "shall be
construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; see also White, 710 So. 2d at 950
n.3 (stating that the State of Florida is "bound to follow the interpretations of the United States
Supreme Court with relation to the fourth amendment and provide no greater protection than those
interpretations") (citation omitted).
8. See White, 119 S.Ct. at 1558.
9. See White, 680 So. 2d at 552; see also FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2)(c) (establishing probable
cause as the standard for seizing subject contraband under the Act).
10. See White, 680 So. 2d at 555. In certifying the question, the district court noted the split
in federal circuit court decisions concerning the issue. See id. See, eg., United States v. Decker, 19
F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554 (1 th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d
1297 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bush, 647
F.2d 357 (1981). But see United States v. Dixon, I F.3d 1080 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Lasanata, 978 F.3d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. linn, 880 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1989).
11. See White, 710 So. 2d at 954-55.
12. See White, 119 S. Ct. at 1560.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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delineated exceptions. 4 Among the exceptions to the rule that a warrant
must be secured before a search is undertaken is the so-called "automobile
exception."" In general, the automobile exception states that vehicles have
a diminished degree of protection under the Fourth Amendment because
17
of their inherent mobility16 and pervasive governmental regulation.
The Supreme Court first recognized an exception to the general warrant
requirement for moving vehicles in Carrollv. UnitedStates." In Carroll,
the Court considered the admissibility into evidence of contraband seized
during the warrantless search of an automobile stopped on an open
highway. 9 The issue in Carrollwas whether the warrantless search of the
defendant's automobile violated the Fourth Amendment, thus rendering the
evidence seized during the search inadmissible at trial.2'
In affirming the district court's conviction, the Court held that
contraband concealed and transported in an automobile may be searched
for without warrant, provided that there is probable cause to believe the car
contains contraband articles which the police are entitled to seize.2 ' The
Carrollcourt reasoned that the inherent mobility of automobiles creates an
immediate danger in that vehicles whose contents are subject to seizure
will be removed from the jurisdiction before a warrant can be obtained,
thus making rigorous enforcement of a general warrant requirement
impracticable."2
The mobility of vehicles was, by the Court's own admission, the basis
23 In reaching its conclusion, the Carrollcourt
of the holding in Carroll.
expressly considered the findings of the First, Second, and Fourth
Congresses which, when they drafted the Fourth Amendment,
distinguished between the need for a warrant to search a structure and a
moveable vessel.24 The Court relied upon this historical evidence in

14. See United States v. Plamondon, 407 U.S. 297,318 (1972) (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). In general, the exceptions to the warrant requirement exist to protect
law enforcement officers and preserve evidence from destruction. See id.
15. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,390 (1985) (surveyingthe long-recognized
distinction between stationary structures and automobiles under the Fourth Amendment).
16. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (establishing exception to
warrant requirement for inherently mobile vehicles).
17. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (holding that
governmental regulation of vehicles for public safety reduces expectations of privacy in
automobiles, and serves as a basis to invoke the automobile exception).
18. 267 U.S. at 153.
19. See id. at 160.
20. See id. at 143.
21. See id. at 156.
22. See id. at 153.
23. See id. at 151.
24. See id. The Carrollcourt noted that "[w]e have made a somewhat extended reference to
these [early] statutes to show that the guaranty of freedom... by the Fourth Amendment has been
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establishing probable cause, in lieu of a warrant, as the minimum
requirement for a reasonable search of an automobile subject to seizure.25
Subsequent decisions of the Court have reaffirmed this historical approach,
holding that where a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to
believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to
search the vehicle without a warrant.26
Although mobility was the original justification for the automobile
exception, the Court later refined the principle in South Dakota v.
Opperman.27 In Opperman, the respondent appealed his conviction for
possession of marijuana, arguing that the drugs seized during the
warrantless inventory search of his car,28 conducted after the car had been
impounded,29 violated the Fourth Amendment.30 Disagreeing with the
judgment of the state supreme court,3 the Opperman court held that the
search was constitutional, even though there was no probable cause to
believe that the car contained contraband, and no risk that the vehicle
would leave the jurisdiction before a warrant could be obtained.32
In denying the respondent relief, the Opperman court ruled that less
rigorous warrant requirements govern searches of automobiles because, in
addition to their inherent mobility, automobiles provide individuals a lesser
expectation of privacy than a home or office.33 The Court reasoned that
automobiles are subject to pervasive and continuing governmental
regulation, namely inspection and licensing requirements, 34 and that this
regulation therefore diminished expectations of privacy through frequent,

construed, practically since the beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between ... [a] structure... [and an] automobile .... 1"Id. at 153.
25. See id. at 155-56.
26. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300-01 (1999) (applying original
intent analysis to the automobile exception); Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-91 (surveying Court
precedent upholding the automobile exception); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 (recognizing ready
mobility as the original basis for the automobile exception); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,

52 (1970) (holding that the automobile exception is rooted in the inherent mobility of vehicles).
27. 428 U.S. at 364.
28. See id. at 366. The incriminating evidence was found in the unlocked glove compartment
of the car during an inventory search. See id.
29. See id. The respondent's car was impounded for multiple parking violations. See id. All
violations were non-criminal in nature. See id.

30. See id. Presumably, the Fourth Amendment was the basis for the respondent's motion to
suppress and subsequent appeal. See id.
31. See id. at 367. The state supreme court reversed petitioner's conviction on the grounds
that the routine inventory search of the automobile was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. See
id.
32. See id. at 373.
33. See id. at 367.
34. See id. at 368. The Court noted that such pervasive regulations were promulgated in the
interest of public safety, and for the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. See id.
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though non-criminal, contact with law enforcement."5 The Oppermancourt
based its reasoning on the fact that police, on a daily basis, seize and
examine vehicles operating in public areas for non-compliance with
regulations.3 6 In light of these findings, the Court concluded that where an
automobile is located in public, and where there is probable cause, 7 police
may search an automobile without a warrant.38
The Court would later apply the same principles underlying Opperman
to justify the warrantless seizure of a car in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. State. 9
At issue in G.M. Leasingwas whether internal revenue agents violated the
Fourth Amendment when they seized several automobiles without warrant
in satisfaction of income tax liabilities." In rejecting the petitioner's claim
for wrongful levy, a" the Court deferred to the appellate court's
determination that agents had probable cause to believe that the vehicles
held by the petitioner were subject to seizure.42 Based on a prior finding of
probable cause, the Court held that the seizures, which occurred in public
streets, parking lots, and other open spaces, involved no invasion of the
owner's privacy. 3 The G.M. Leasing court concluded that, because there
was probable cause and no invasion of privacy, the warrantless seizures did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.44
Similarly, the Supreme Court in the instant case upheld the warrantless
seizure of an automobile on the basis that the police had probable cause to
believe that the vehicle was subject to seizure.45 A majority of the instant
court ruled that police may seize a vehicle without warrant for the same
reasons-mobility, diminished privacy interests, location in a public

35. See id. at 368-69.
36. Id. at 369.
37. Although there was no probable cause to believe that petitioner's car contained
contraband at the time of the seizure, the Opperman court held that there was probable cause to
perform a routine search ofpetitioner's impounded automobile. Id.The court held that the authority
of police to seize and remove vehicles from the streets for violations of public law is beyond

challenge. See id.
38. See id.

39. 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
40. Id. at 351. The G.M. Leasing court found that the seizure was executed pursuant to an

earlier tax assessment, at which time the owner lost both possessory and privacy interest in the
automobiles prior to the seizures by way of official judgement. See id. at 352 n.18.
41. See id. at 346. Petitioner, G.M. Leasing Corporation, argued that the vehicles were

wrongfully seized for the failure of the individual defendant, general manager of the corporation,
to pay taxes. See id.
42. See id. at 351. Although the cars were registered in the name of the corporation run by
the defendant, the seizing officers had cause to believe that the petitioner corporation was the alter
ego of the defendant. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 352.
45. See White. 119 S. Ct. at 1559.
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space-that the Court has given in recognizing broad police powers to
search a car without a warrant.46 In reversing the judgement of the Florida
Supreme Court, the instant court held that there is no distinction between
seizing a car that contained contraband, and seizing a car that was itself
contraband. 47
In deciding whether the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, the
instant court determined that the proper inquiry was whether the action was
regarded as unlawful when the Amendment was framed.48 In attempting to
grasp the original intent of the Framers, the instant court found that,
contemporaneous with the adoption of the Amendment, Congress had
authorized federal officers to conduct warrantless searches of vessels
whose contents were subject to seizure.49 Consistent with this practice, the
instant court concluded that the seizure of Respondent's car would not
have been unlawful when the Amendment was adopted." To augment its
historical analysis, the instant court also relied upon prior Court precedent
which stated that where federal officers have probable cause to believe that
an automobile contains contraband, the warrantless search of the vehicle
to seize the contraband does not offend the Constitution.51
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the facts of the instant
case failed to justify the seizure of Petitioner's vehicle under the
automobile exception. 2 Justice Stevens noted that the seminal cases
establishing the automobile exception all involved searches of automobiles
for contraband, or temporary seizures to facilitate such searches. 3 In
contrast, the objective of the instant seizure was to arrest the "criminal"
vehicle, not to facilitate a search for contraband. 4 Justice Stevens further
asserted that the warrantless seizure could not be justified by the
automobile exception because there was no risk that the car would leave
the jurisdiction while the owner of the vehicle was in police custody.5
Moreover, an exception based on a reduced expectation of privacy also
failed to justify the instant seizure, since the governmental regulatory

46. See id. at 1559-60.
47. See id. at 1559.
48. See id. at 1558.
49. See id. at 1558-59. The instant court emphasized its jurisprudence of original intent the
instant analysis, stating that "we have taken care to inquire whether the action was regarded as an
unlawful search and seizure when then the Amendment was framed." Id. at 1558.
50. See id. at 1560.
51. See id. at 1558.
52. See id. at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 1561.
54. See id. at 1561-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,
388 (1985) (search for narcotics); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1970) (search for
weapon); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (search for contraband liquor).
55. See White, 119 S. Ct. at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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schemes upon which cases like Opperman were based did not contemplate
permanent deprivation of property. 6 Justice Stevens concluded that,
without a legitimate application of the automobile exception, the
presumption that warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment should prevail.57
The trend from Carrollto the instant case suggests that the automobile
exception has all but swallowed the general warrant requirement for
vehicular searches and seizures.5 8 In holding that a car can be lawfully
seized at any time after police develop probable cause, the instant Court
has expanded the automobile exception beyond the exigent circumstances
59 and even beyond the general concerns
of mobility as described in Carroll,
of privacy enunciated in Oppennan, ° and G.M. Leasing."'The automobile
exception no longer requires the warrant of an impartial magistrate to
validate the seizure of a car; rather, such seizures have become subject to
the discretion of law enforcement officers. 62 In making this determination,
the instant Court reaffirmed that there is, indeed, a greatly diminished
expectation of privacy in moveable vehicles, and has brought Court
precedent in line with the majority of state and federal courts that have
considered the issue.63
As a result of the instant holding, the constitutional standard for seizure
of personal property has become significantly more lenient than the

56. See id. at 1562 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at 1563 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Justice Stevens' dissent alluded to Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 479
(1971), when, in evaluating the applicability of the automobile exception, it stated that: "it is but
a short step to the position that it is never necessary for the police to obtain a warrant before
searching and seizing an automobile, provided that they have probable cause." Id.
59. Although the instant court held that police may seize an automobile without warrant
several months after police developed probable cause, the court claimed it expressed no opinion
about whether excessive delay prior to a seizure could invalidate the probable cause required for
a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See White, 119 S. Ct. at 1559 n.4. But see, e.g.,
Chambers,399 U.S. at 52 (holding that where police have probable cause to perform an immediate
search of a car for contraband, they may also perform a later search without warrant based upon the
probable cause developed at the time of the seizure). Nevertheless, the holding of the instant case
suggests, at a minimum, that the exigent circumstance of mobility is not necessary for a warrantless
seizure to pass constitutional muster.
60. The issues of privacy raised in Opperman were related to the State's regulatory regime
for road safety. 428 U.S. 364,367-68 (1976). In the instant case, vehicular ordinances were not in
question, but rather a state forfeiture statute that was not intended to promote safe operation of
vehicles. See White, 119 S. Ct. at 1558 n.1.
61. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. In the instant case, the police acted at their
own discretion, and the respondent's privacy was not compromised until the time of the seizure.
See White, 119 S. Ct. at 1557.
62. See White, 119 S. Ct. at 1560.
63. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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standard for the seizure of real property.' Unlike the instant case involving
personal property, the Supreme Court has held that before real property
may be seized, the seizing authorities must secure a warrant and provide
notice and opportunity to the property owner to be heard before the seizure
is executed.6" While the Court has consistently recognized Fourth
Amendment protection against governmental intrusion into the home, 66 the
instant court has concluded that the warrant presumption is all but
irrelevant with respect to forfeitable personal property such as the
automobile, leaving claimants with only a post-seizure hearing to protect
their interests. 7 As Justice Stevens noted, this reliance on post-seizure
hearings to protect claimants' interests is problematic given the pecuniary
interests of law enforcement in the forfeiture of property. 8
With respect to civil forfeiture proceedings, the instant case limits the
Fourth Amendment as a defense for claimants seeking to recover seized
property.69 This limitation on Fourth Amendment protection forces
claimants to rely on other constitutional provisions to protect against the
seizure of personal property for the purpose of civil forfeiture.70 In light of
the Court's prior holdings that the applicability of one constitutional
amendment does not pre-empt the guarantees of another,71 claimants will
likely couch their defenses within the protections afforded by other
amendments.72

64. Compare United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,55-56 (1993)
(holding that compliance with the Fourth Amendment, alone, is insufficient to justify the seizure
of real property) with White, 119 S. Ct. at 1559 (recognizing probable cause as the standard for
constitutionality of warrantless seizures under the Fourth Amendment). See generallyFLA. STAT.
§ 932.703 (2)(a)-(b) (1997) (establishing different standards for the seizure of real and personal
properties),
65. See, e.g., Good, 510 U.S. at 55-56 (holding that compliance with the Fourth Amendment,

alone, is insufficient to justify the seizure of real property).
66. See id.
67. See FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2)(a).
68. See White, 119 S. Ct. at 1562 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see FLA. STAT. § 932.7055(a)-(8);
see also Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1977) (holding invalid a seizure where
authority issuing its probable cause had a pecuniary interest in issuing a warrant).
69. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
70. Although the Court has held that Fourth Amendment protection applies to forfeiture
proceedings, see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,696 (1965), the instant
court failed to evaluate the impact of the instant holding on court precedent.
71. See, e.g., Good, 510 U.S. at 49 ("We have rejected the view that the applicability of one
constitution pre-empts the guarantees of another."); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56,70 (1992)
("Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of
the Constitutions commands.").
72. See, e.g., Good,510 U.S. at 62 (holding seizure invalid underthe Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,622 (1993) (holding seizure invalid under
the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause).
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Within the criminal context,73 the instant holding suggests that the
Fourth Amendment can no longer serve as a basis for suppressing evidence
produced after the warrantless seizure of a vehicle, so long as the seizure
was based upon probable cause.74 In order to suppress evidence in such a
case, a defendant must now rely upon state constitutional equivalents
protecting against warrantless searches and seizures for relief. 75 This
protection, however, may be more perceived than real in states that
interpret their constitutions in light of the federal Constitution, and defer
to the Supreme Court in its interpretation. 76 For these states, the instant
holding suggests that there is no constitutional basis, state or federal, to
argue for the exclusion of evidence produced during the warrantless
seizure77 of an automobile, where the seizure was based upon probable
cause.

Consistent with the Court's historically broad interpretation of the
automobile exception, the instant court once again ruled against the need
for police to secure a warrant prior to seizing a vehicle. In holding that
probable cause alone, without proof of the exigent circumstance, justifies
the warrantless seizure of an automobile, the instant court has taken the
automobile exception to its logical conclusion: that there is little-if
any-Fourth Amendment protection for a vehicle located in a public area.
While the instant holding has significant consequences for defendants in
both the criminal and civil contexts, the ultimate victim of the instant
court's decision may be the Constitution itself.

73. Although seizures executed pursuant to forfeiture statutes are civil in nature, any
contraband discovered during an inventory search of the seized vehicle may lead to criminal
prosecution. See, e.g., White, 119 S. Ct. at 1557-58.
74. But cf. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 696 (holding that the exclusionary rule
under the Fourth Amendment applies to civil forfeiture).
75. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (adopting the language of U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
76. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
77. See id.
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